IDAHO DOWN

13th annual Boise ISSA Infosec Conference 14 MAY 2015 Russ McRee @holisticinfosec







13th annual Boise ISSA Infosec Conference 14 MAY 2015 Russ McRee @holisticinfosec We have all been,

or will be,

compromised.

"There are two types of American companies, those that have been hacked and those that don't know they have been hacked." — Eric Holder

"Assume nothing, test everything." — Veracode

The sky is not falling, steps can be taken to reduce vulnerabilities leading to exploitation and compromise.

That said, you are always being probed and assessed for "areas of opportunity."

Who you're up against

Cyber Warrior

- State sponsored, highly trained
- Goals: cyber warfare, intellectual property theft
- Uses APTs, malware, SQL injection, sniffers
- Preferred Targets: Defense, Gov, Energy, Utilities, Tech

'Principled' Idealist

- Agenda driven hacktivist, skills vary, cell ops
- Goals: disruption
- Uses Bots, malware, DDoS
- Preferred targets: Defense, Gov, Tech

Per Narus' The Many Faces of Hackers: The Personas to Defend Against

Professional Mercenary

- Commercially motivated criminal, skilled, well funded, organized
- Goals: steal everything (funds, intellectual property, resources)
- Uses APTs, malware, SQL injection, sniffers, e-commerce portals
- Preferred targets: financials, retail, healthcare


Malicious Insider

- Motivations vary, skills vary, but has insider knowledge
- Goals: steal intellectual property & intel, disrupt
- Uses data exfiltration, service disruption
- Preferred targets: employer or ex-employer

Nationalist

- Fueled by nationalism, skills vary
- **Goals:** steal IP & trade secrets
- Uses DDoS, malware, SQL injection
- Preferred targets: government, defense, technology, R&D

"Greater understanding of these personas can lead to the implementation of optimal security measures to counter likely threats." - Narus



Tradecraft

Reconnaissance

Search engines, social networks

Mapping

Port scanning, finger printing, web services, interception proxies, spidering

Discovery

Packet capture, fuzzing, vulnerability scanning

Exploitation

- SQL, XSS, CSRF, payloads, password cracking
- Social engineering, escalation, pivoting, exfiltration

It all begins with a phish...

From: Tablet Survey [mailto:surveys@IDAH0.com]

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2015 10:02 AM

To:

Subject: Mobile Workforce Survey

Mobile Workforce Survey

The State of Idaho Information Technology Department's Mobile Workforce Team has begun exploring the benefits of issuing various tablet technologies to employees in specific roles. The roles being considered at this time include engineering, operational and administrative roles. A limited number of employees will be asked to complete a mobile workforce survey. A number of those employees who complete the survey will be selected to pilot our initial round of tablet technologies, including Android, Apple, and Microsoft technologies. This program is only available to CURRENT, ACTIVE FULL TIME State of Idaho employees (retirees and contractors are NOT eligible). If you'd like to participate in the program, please complete the following survey. The initial phase is limited to a small number of employees, please do not share the survey link or discuss the program with other employees.

http://MobileWorkforceSurvey.IDAH0.com/ActiveEmployeesOnly.asp


If you have any questions, please contact <u>surveys@IDAH0.com</u>. We're looking forward to seeing your response!

Respectfully,


The Mobile Workforce Team


Why cross-site scripting matters





cross-site scripting matte







http://www.persi.idaho.gov/search.cfm?

<u>qt=</u>"><iframe src=<u>http://</u>

MobileWorkforceSurvey.IDAHO.com/


ActiveEmployeesOnly.asp>&btnG.x=0&btnG.y=0&bt

nG=Search

Speaking of payloads...

All good phishing attacks need great payloads.

@ChrisTruncer's Veil-Evasion creates payloads that evade antimalware detection.



```
Edit View Search Terminal Help
File
Veil-Evasion |
               [Version]: 2.13.4
[Web]: https://www.veil-framework.com/ | [Twitter]: @VeilFramework
[*] Available payloads:
       1)
               auxiliary/coldwar wrapper
       2)
               auxiliary/pyinstaller_wrapper
       3)
               c/meterpreter/rev http
       4)
               c/meterpreter/rev http service
       5)
               c/meterpreter/rev tcp
       6)
               c/meterpreter/rev tcp service
               c/shellcode inject/flatc
       7)
       8)
               cs/meterpreter/rev http
       9)
               cs/meterpreter/rev https
       10)
               cs/meterpreter/rev tcp
       11)
               cs/shellcode inject/base64 substitution
       12)
               cs/shellcode inject/virtual
       13)
               native/Hyperion
       14)
               native/backdoor factory
       15)
               native/pe scrambler
       16)
                powershell/meterpreter/rev http
       17)
               powershell/meterpreter/rev https
       18)
                powershell/meterpreter/rev tcp
       19)
                powershell/shellcode inject/download virtual
                powershell/shellcode inject/psexec virtual
       20)
```


Uh oh, someone clicked, we haz shell DEMO


WTF just happened?

- Victim receives phish, clicked because the URL looked legitimate thanks to XSS
- Initial payload drops, victim runs it per instructions in the survey
- When executed, invokes PowerShell and establishes reverse shell back to Metasploit server
- Attacker confirms system level privilege, uses spool to write results only on attacker server, invokes a command shell
- With PowerShell, invokes Mimikatz in memory only and dumps credentials
- No fuss, no muss, and little-to-no filesystem evidence

What if social engineering doesnt work?

prequently seen threat actor for Web App Attacks. "Virtually every attack in this data set was opportunistic in nature, all aimed at easy marks. Information, Financial Services, and **Public** entities dominate the victim demographics."





SQL injection represents 19% of web app attacks because it's **easy**

DEMO

And now, for the blue teams

Attack yourselves!

- Use the same tactics attackers do.
- Emulate your adversary.
- If you don't have to have the skillset in house, you can still utilize skilled, paid services.
- Think like an attacker (this is essential) or hire someone to do so for you.

Advance your forensics & NSM capabilities

- Network Security Monitoring
- Memory analysis

Did someone mention memory analysis?

Rekall: a Volatility fork, included in GRR Current release: 1.3.2 Dammastock Project includes **WinPmem**, a key differentiator

Memory can be accessed on a live system, for real time response, without taking a memory image.

Why is this important?

Live analysis of our earlier attack... DEMO

Rekall review

rekal -f \\.\pmem netstat

rekal -f \\.\pmem pstree

rekal -f \\.\pmem malfind pid=1284, dump_dir="/tmp/"

rekal -f \\.\pmem memdump pid=2396, dump_dir="/tmp/"

Additional defense opportunities

Threat Model

STRIDE applies to infrastructure as much as applications

- Spoofing
- Tampering
- Repudiation (non-repudiation)
- Information Disclosure
- Elevation of privilege

ICS-CERT: Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies

- Preserve forensic data
- Credential management (AuthN/AuthZ)
 - Increase Logging Capabilities
- DNS Logging with Host Level Granularity
- Audit Systems for Suspicious Files
- Network Segmentation/Isolation
- Strict role-based access control (RBAC)
- Application whitelisting

Resources

Papers:

- Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies
 - https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B
- Mitigating Pass-the-Hash (PtH) Attacks and Other Credential Theft
 - http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=36036

Books:

- Threat Modeling: Designing for Security Adam Shostack
- The Practice of Network Security Monitoring Richard Bejtlich
- Applied Network Security Monitoring Chris Sanders, Jason Smith
- Data-Driven Security Jay Jacobs, Bob Rudis

Websites:

OWASP.org holisticinfosec.org & holisticinfosec.blogspot.com

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